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A B S T R A C T
This paper investigates the impact of increased media competition on the quantity and quality of news pro-
vided and, ultimately, on political participation. I build a new county-level panel dataset of local newspaper
presence, newspapers’ number of journalists, costs and revenues and political turnout in France, from 1944
to 2014. I estimate the effect of newspaper entry by comparing counties that experience entry to similar
counties in the same years that do not. Both sets of counties exhibit similar trends prior to entry, but those
with entry experience substantial declines in the average number of journalists. An increased number of
newspapers is also associated with fewer articles and less hard news provision. Newspaper entry, and the
associated decline in information provision, is ultimately found to decrease voter turnout at local elections.
Exploiting the long time span covered by my data, I discuss a number of mechanisms that may drive these
empirical ﬁndings. First, I examine the relationship between increased competition and media capture in
the aftermath of WW2, when newspapers were biased and the advertising market was underdeveloped. I
then show that in the recent period the effects are stronger in counties with more homogeneous popula-
tions, as predicted by a vertical product differentiation framework, whereas there is little impact in counties
with more heterogeneous populations.
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1. Introduction
Will an increase in competition in the marketplace for news and
ideas — triggered by technical change and information technologies
— lead to a better coverage of general information and an increase in
political participation? Or might it have the opposite outcome? This
paper investigates the consequences of an increase in the number
of media outlets on the quantity and quality of news provided and,
ultimately, changes in voter turnout at elections.
More media competition is often thought to imply an increase
in the dissemination of information, thereby enhancing the extent
of ideological diversity, promoting truth and contributing to the
political process. In this spirit, recent studies in political economy
have advanced the existence of a positive causal link between radio
and newspaper entry and political participation (Strömberg, 2004b;
Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2009; Gentzkow et al., 2011). How-
ever, the focus of these studies is on media access — the move from 0
to 1media outlet. Instead, in this paper, I considermedia competition
— the move from n > 0 to n + 1 media outlets. There is indeed
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104077
0047-2727/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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no reason to expect that the intensive margin of the media acts as
the extensive margin; in particular because media competition may
affect the content of media outlets.
To tackle these questions, I build a new panel of local daily news-
papers and local election turnout in France from 1944 to 2014. For
several reasons, the French local daily newspaper industry is well
suited to testing the impact of media competition on turnout at local
elections. First, given that on average over 70% of the eligible voters in
a county1 read a local daily newspaper every day, this industry may
be key to political participation at the local level. Newspapers are
arguably the most important form of local media when it comes to
local news and public affairs (see e.g. Snyder and Stromberg, 2010).
Television and radio rarely allocate more than a few seconds to a
local news story (Hess, 1991). Contrariwise, local daily newspapers
in France tend to publish several editions: while these editions share
a number of “national” or “regional” pages, several local news pages
vary from one edition to the other. Second, during this time period, I
observemany entries and exits of newspapers that I can use for iden-
tiﬁcation. Finally, I choose to focus on this industry because of the
availability of excellent data.
My dataset includes every local daily newspaper published in
France between 1944 and 2014. I determine for each year the num-
ber of newspapers present in each French county — the natural news
market; I collect annual data on each paper’s location and circula-
tion. I also put together annual information on the total number of
journalists working for each newspaper. Furthermore, for the sub-
period 1960–2014, I collect annual information on each paper’s costs
and revenues, as well as on the journalists’ monthly gross salary.2 I
use this data to quantify the effect of entry on the quality of newspa-
pers; following the existing literature, I use the number of journalists
on staff as my ﬁrst proxy for newspaper quality (see e.g. Hamil-
ton, 2004; Berry and Waldfogel, 2010; Angelucci and Cagé, 2019;
Cagé et al., 2017). I supplement this data for recent years (2005–
2012) with measures of newspaper content, in particular of the size
of newspapers (number of articles and of words). I use the quantity
of news as my second proxy for newspaper quality; indeed, more
content is presumably always preferred to less (see e.g. Berry and
Waldfogel, 2010). Finally, I use newspaper content data to classify
each article as hard news or soft news.3 Hard news corresponds to
public affairs news, for example national and international news or
economic news, and tends to be regarded as informative in the politi-
cal process. On the contrary, soft news corresponds to entertainment
or commodity news, say about sports or fashion.
The ﬁrst empirical challenge is to isolate the impact of newspa-
per entry on incumbent newspapers. My identiﬁcation strategy uses
the timing of entries as shocks affecting incumbents. I estimate the
effect of newspaper entry by comparing counties that experience
an entry to similar counties in the same years that do not. Because
the entry decision is made to maximize proﬁts, counties that expe-
rience an entry are likely to differ from other counties, both at the
time of entry and in future periods. The identifying assumption is
that newspapers in these other counties form a valid counterfactual
1 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, I use the term “county” when referring to a
“département”. In the administrative division of France, a “département” corresponds
roughly to a county in the United States.
2 To give a ﬂavor of what is generally available in terms of newspaper cost and rev-
enue data, it is worth remembering that in their study of how economic incentives
shape ideological diversity in the media, Gentzkow et al. (2014) have no other choice
but to use balance sheet data on anonymous newspapers that they match with news-
papers using circulation value. In contrast, I have actual annual balance sheet data
for French local daily newspapers from 1960 to 2014. Moreover, to the extent of my
knowledge, I am the very ﬁrst to provide detailed historical information on the annual
number of journalists at the newspaper level.
3 I use the term “hard” here in the colloquial and political science meaning of hard-
ness as a measure of information content. Hard does not mean hard in the economic
sense of veriﬁability.
for the incumbent newspapers in counties that experience an entry,
after conditioning for differences in preexisting trends, newspaper
ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, and a large set of demographic covari-
ates controlling for the age composition, occupational structure and
educational level of counties. In particular, I show that counties that
experience entry and these counterfactual counties exhibit similar
trends in circulation, revenues, expenses, and number of journalists
prior to newspaper entry. I use both aggregate event studies and
a ﬁxed-effect model allowing for time-varying effects of entry to
perform this analysis.
I show that entry reduces the circulation of incumbent newspa-
pers by nearly 20%. This leads to a 38 to 43% decrease in incumbent
newspapers’ revenues and expenses and a 19 to 35% decrease in
the number of journalists working for incumbent newspapers. More-
over, this decrease in the number of journalists is not compensated
by an overall increase in the aggregate number of journalists work-
ing at the news-market level. I provide anecdotal evidence of a
“switching effect”, with a number of journalists working for the
incumbent newspaper’s newsroom switching to the entrant’s one.
Furthermore, using data for recent years (2005–2012), I show that an
additional newspaper leads to a 16 to 53% decrease in newspapers’
size (depending on the measures used: number of articles, number
of words, etc.), to a 9 to 13% decrease in the share of hard news and
to a 25 to 32% decrease in the amount of hard news.
Finally, I look into the impact of media competition on participa-
tion at elections. I match my data on the number of local newspapers
with city-level data on turnout at mayoral elections that I digitize
from oﬃcial records.4 My empirical strategy follows Gentzkow et al.
(2011). I look at changes in political participation in cities that expe-
rience a newspaper entry or exit relative to other cities in the same
region and year that do not. I ﬁnd that an increase in newspaper com-
petition has a robust negative impact on local election turnout, with
one additional newspaper decreasing turnout by approximately 0.3
percentage points. This effect is robust to a range of alternative spec-
iﬁcations and controls, which brings conﬁdence in interpreting it as
being causal.
To sum up, I show that increased media competition is associ-
ated with a decline in information provision and a decrease in voter
turnout at local elections. Ultimately, I take advantage of the rich-
ness of my data covering various newspapers over a long time span,
and discuss a number of theoretical mechanisms that may drive
these empirical ﬁndings depending on the historical moment. First
I collect data on each newspaper’s political bias. In the aftermath of
World War II, many local newspapers were the political organs of
parties in France. Being controlled by political interests, they were
guided both by a proﬁt motive and by political aspirations. Under
conditions of low potential advertising revenues available to media,
increased competition may have led to a greater supply of biased
news, and a decrease in readers’ willingness-to-pay. Focusing on the
post-war period (1944–1958) I ﬁnd that, in line with this prediction,
the decline in circulation generated by entry is larger for partisan
than for independent newspapers.
The Fifth Republic marked the end of biased coverage for local
newspapers in France. In a context where newspapers deliver
news preferred by consumers, vertical product differentiation pro-
vides an alternative simple explanation for the heretofore puz-
zling negative impact of increased media competition. I lay out a
simple theoretical framework with heterogeneous consumers and
two proﬁt-maximizing newspapers facing quality-dependent ﬁxed
4 City-level data on turnout at mayoral elections is hardly available in the United
States. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) collect information on mayoral elections between
1950 and 2005 in over 400 cities which is, to the extent of my knowledge, the most
complete dataset as of today.
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costs.5 When heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay is
high, the market is not covered under competition. The entrant
expands the market and newspapers differentiate on quality to
soften price competition and increase market power. One duopolist
produces a lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist, and the
other one a higher-quality newspaper. In contrast, when heterogene-
ity is low, the market is covered under competition. In the extreme
case of no heterogeneity, the entrant garners half of the market and
halves the incumbent newspaper’s circulation. Both duopolists pro-
duce a lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist. As predicted
by this simple theoretical framework, I ﬁnd that business stealing
is particularly strong in low-heterogeneity areas with a 44% drop in
the circulation of incumbent newspapers following entry. The extent
of heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay across counties is mea-
sured by regional-level income inequality (using exhaustive income
tax data). Similarly, the drop in the size of the newsroom is 50% in
low-heterogeneity counties.
Literature review
My results complement a growing literature on media and pol-
itics. Considering different media outlets, a number of papers have
found that media access increases political participation (Strömberg,
2004b; Gentzkow, 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2009;
Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido, 2013; Banerjee et al., 2010; Snyder
and Stromberg, 2010; Gentzkow et al., 2011). My paper contributes
to this literature by studying the non-monotonicity of this ﬁnding.
Moving from 0 to 1 newspaper (media access) can have very differ-
ent effects than moving from n > 0 to n + 1 newspapers (media
competition). Under certain conditions, an increase in the competi-
tiveness of themarketmay indeed lead to a “race to the bottom”with
a dumbing-down of newspaper content and a decrease in political
participation (Zaller, 1999; Arnold, 2002). Considering the intensive
margin of the media is thus of particular importance in today’s high-
choice media environment. George and Waldfogel (2006) show that
the expansion of The New York Times led to substitution away from
local newspapers among high-income readers, also affecting local
newspapers’ positioning.
To the extent of my knowledge, Drago et al. (2014) is the only
paper to study the effect of newspaper competition on electoral par-
ticipation beyond the effect of newspaper access.6 They ﬁnd that the
entry of local newspapers leads to an increase in turnout in munici-
pal elections in Italy. They also ﬁnd that it increases total readership
per capita, which may explain the increase in turnout they obtain
and might be due to high heterogeneity of Italian readership.7 Inves-
tigating whether the impact of competition varies with the extent
of heterogeneity in consumer’s willingness-to-pay is the second
contribution of my paper.
While existing literature has focused on the economic incentives
that shape ideological diversity in the media (Strömberg, 2004a;
Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006;
Anand et al., 2007; Gentzkow et al., 2014; Qin et al., 2018), I test
empirically how an increase in the number of newspapers in a news
market affects the quality of newspapers (the size of the news-
room and the number of articles) and the share of hard news in
5 Newspapers ﬁrst choose simultaneously their quality and then compete simulta-
neously in price. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness-to-
pay for newspaper quality.
6 Becker and Milbourn (2011) study the effect of increased competition in the
ratings industry on the quality of ratings and ﬁnd that it tends to decrease this quality.
7 An alternative explanation is that increased competition decreased the capture of
Italian media, and so increased readers’ willingness-to-pay (to the extent that readers
are adversely impacted by capture, a point well made by Bignon and Flandreau (2014)
in the context of interwar France).
newspapers’ content. I document a negative relationship between
media competition and the quantity and quality of news produced.
I highlight two different mechanisms that may help rationalize this
ﬁnding, and that are speciﬁc to different “stages of development” of
newspapers (to use Petrova’s (2008) terminology). The time period
covered by my data is indeed characterized ﬁrst by a media sys-
tem in which newspapers depended on the political parties (roughly
speaking the Fourth Republic), and then by the rise of nonpartisan
reporting (since the end of the 1950s).
In the 1940s–1950s, most local newspapers were the organs of
political parties. An important literature uncovers a negative rela-
tionship between competition and media capture. Theoretically,
Besley and Prat (2006) show that competition decreases the gov-
ernment’s ability to silence the media. Empirically, Bignon and
Flandreau (2014), considering interwar France, underscore the qual-
ity effects of newspaper competition. Likewise, Djankov et al. (2003)
highlight that “competition among media ﬁrms assures that voters,
consumers, and investors obtain (. . . ) unbiased and accurate informa-
tion.” In other words, an increase in the number of media outlets
should result in more accountability and stronger checks and bal-
ances. On the contrary, this paper shows that an increase in media
competition has led historically to a decrease in readers’ willingness-
to-pay and in newspaper quality. At the time of the Fourth Republic,
the advertising market was underdeveloped in France. The further
drop in advertising revenues generated by newspaper entry may
have led to an increase in media bias — as predicted by Petrova
(2012) when the special interest group does not care about the
size of the audience — and a decline in readers’ willingness-to-
pay.8 In line with this reasoning, I show that the negative effects of
increased competition are stronger for partisan than for independent
newspapers.
The French local newspaper industry is characterized by the rise
of nonpartisan reporting in the 1960s–1970s. Despite the weakening
of media capture, the negative relationship between increased com-
petition and the quality of news produced still holds. With depoliti-
cization, the focus of newspapers shifts entirely to local information.
Newspaper readers are better described at that time as heteroge-
neous consumers who differ vertically in their willingness-to-pay for
quality rather than horizontally in their political bias. From this point
of view, my paper is related to the research on product quality in
the context of vertical consumer heterogeneity (Shaked and Sutton,
1982; Tirole, 1988; Choi and Shin, 1992; Motta, 1993).
Finally, my ﬁndings on participation in local elections relate to
studies by Falck et al. (2014), Gavazza et al. (2018) and Campante
et al. (2017), who all estimate a negative effect of the introduction
of the internet on turnout, due to a substitution away from media
with greater news content.9 Increased competition in the media
market — or reciprocally, ownership consolidation through merg-
ers (Fan, 2013) — may affect media outlets’ content decision. Using
evidence from radio broadcasting, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) ﬁnd
that increased concentration increases variety.10 Similarly, Berry and
Waldfogel (2010) show that in daily newspapers, the average quality
8 Another mechanism may have been at play. Theoretically, Neven and Thisse
(1989) have shown that when ﬁrms (here newspapers) compete both vertically on
quality and horizontally on variety (here bias), they choose maximum differentiation
on the political dimension and provide minimum quality if the horizontal range is
broad enough relative to the quality range. Political polarization indeed allows the
media to escape price competition. Obviously, these different interpretations are not
mutually exclusive.
9 See also Gentzkow (2006) and Prior (2005), who ﬁnd that once television and
cable TV, respectively, become available to US viewers, some of them stop watching
news programs and sort into entertainment programs. Enikolopov et al. (2011) show
that exposure to an independent TV news channel reduces turnout in parliamentary
elections in Russia.
10 See also DellaVigna and Hermle (2017) onmedia concentration and bias coverage.
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of products increases with market size, but that the market does not
offer much additional variety as it grows larger. Angelucci and Cagé
(2019) document a negative effect of the introduction of advertising
on French television on the amount of journalistic-intensive content
produced by national newspapers, as proxied by the size of their
newsroom. George (2007) also uses data on reporters when studying
how differentiation and variety increase with concentration in mar-
kets for daily newspapers. This paper differs from this past empirical
work in the direct use of media content to measure the size of news-
papers and the shares of hard and soft news, in the large sample of
media outlets I cover (287 newspapers), and in my ability to study
these effects over a long period of time (1944–2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
I describe the French local daily newspaper industry, provide evi-
dence on turnout at local elections, and review the new dataset I
build for this study. In Section 3, I study empirically the impact of an
entry on the quality of newspapers and on the content they produce.
Section 4 describes the different mechanisms that may help ratio-
nalize the negative relationship between newspaper competition
and information provision I uncover. In Section 5, I investigate the
impact of changes in the number of newspapers on turnout at local
elections. Section 6 discusses alternative mechanisms and external
validity. Section 7 concludes. Finally, the paper is supplemented by
an extensive online Appendix including all details of data sources and
empirical speciﬁcations, as well as a full-ﬂedged theoretical model
and associated formal propositions and proofs.
2. Local daily newspapers and local elections in France:
historical background, data and descriptive statistics
As stated in the introduction, the French local daily newspaper
industry is particularly interesting to study because of the impor-
tance of this industry and the availability of high-quality data. I
construct an annual dataset on the evolution of the newspaper mar-
ket between 1944 and 2014. Section 2.1 presents a brief historical
background on the newspaper industry, and on its evolution over
time. Section 2.2 discusses basic industry characteristics and reviews
the dataset. Finally, Section 2.3 describes the French electoral system
for local elections and presents the new dataset I built on election
results.
2.1. Historical background
The focus of this paper is on the local daily newspaper industry
in France between 1944 and 2014. The choice of 1944 as my ﬁrst
year of interest arises from historical reasons: the SecondWorldWar
marked an almost wholly clean break with the prewar media sys-
tem, with the press industry effectively rebuilt from scratch once the
conﬂict ended.
The pre-Second World War French newspapers were corrupted,
and historians such as March Bloch “placed part of the blame for the
country’s defeat (. . . ) on France debasement of its media.” (Bignon and
Flandreau, 2014). In the immediate post-war period, newspapers
accused of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers were closed down
and their assets redistributed to owners untainted by collaboration.
While the old prewar press groups were eliminated, a new press
system was reconstituted from independent companies. Of the 206
(local and national) daily newspaper titles that had been published
in France in 1939, only 28 were able to resume operations after the
war (Guillauma, 1988).
2.1.1. The post-war regulations
Furthermore, in 1944–1945, new regulations were enacted to
avoid repeating past mistakes. A number of reforms called for
massive government intervention in the press sector and media
ownership regulation. The so-called “Blue Notebook” (the press
reform prepared by the National Federation of the Clandestine press)
noted that “a newspaper should not be considered as an industry.” The
August 26th 1944 Press Reform Order (“ordonnance”) imposed very
strong restrictions reﬂecting the imperative of newspaper indepen-
dence from money interests. These reforms were never seriously
implemented and suffered various fates, however.11 As noted by
Schwoebel (1968), rarely “a revolution has failed so miserably.”. In the
end, the promise of a new statute of the press never succeeded. In
1954, a law was passed that permitted the sale of the conﬁscated
equipment at 1940 prices to the newspapers that were currently
using it. This can be considered the end of the post-war attempt to
reorganize the rules under which the press would operate.
The post-war reforms nonetheless cleaned up the corruption that
has been so prevalent in the press before the war (Albert, 1990).
Moreover, some of the provisions of the 1944 press reforms have
had lasting results, in particular regarding the provision of wire news
and the distribution of newspapers. E.g. the “rebirth” of the Agence
France Presse (AFP) in 1944 as a “public establishment” partly subsi-
dized by generous government subscriptions marked the beginning
of an original scheme of public subsidies to private (and very soon
independent) wire news provision.12
2.1.2. The post-war period: the golden age of the partisan press
In the wake of WW2, most newspapers were politically aﬃliated
in France (Guillauma, 1988; Martin, 1997). I collect information on
the political aﬃliation of the newspapers from Guillauma (1995),
the Cahiers de L’Institut Français de Presse, and the French Ministry of
Information archives.13
Fig. 1 reports the distribution of the local daily newspapers in
1946 (Fig. 1a) and in 1949 (Fig. 1b), depending on their political
aﬃliation. In 1946, the Socialist party (i.e. the SFIO) had the highest
number of aﬃliated newspapers (42), followed by the “Mouvement
Républicain Populaire” (MRP) (35) and the Communist party (31). In
terms of aggregated circulation, the orders of magnitude are mostly
equivalent for these three political movements (around 2.4–2.5 mil-
lion copies a day) as well as for the non-aﬃliated “information”
newspapers (27 newspapers, with a total circulation of 2.5 million
copies).
The total number of newspapers — and the total circulation —
fell rapidly in the post-war period, which is also characterized by a
change in the propensity of the newspapers to be aﬃliated to parties.
Between 1946 and 1949, the number of newspapers aﬃliated to the
Socialist party dropped from 42 to 32, and the number of newspa-
pers aﬃliated to the Communist party fell from 31 to 18 (Fig. 1b). In
1955, there were only 15 remaining Socialist newspapers. The rise of
nonpartisan reporting has been mostly driven by economic reasons:
newspapers gave up their political aﬃliation in order to broaden
their readership (Guillauma, 1988; Martin, 1997).
2.1.3. The rise of nonpartisan reporting
The depoliticization of the newspapers in the post-war period
explains their success in terms of circulation, much like their focus
on local news. However, while most newspapers dropped their polit-
ical aﬃliation after the 1950s, some nonetheless retained a biased
editorial stance. To investigate the newspapers’ stance, I explore a
previously unexploited data source, the “Reports of the Prefects with
11 Why is it so? First, their text was poorly drafted. Second, there was no penalty
for failing to meet the requirements and no agency in charge of enforcement (Legrès,
1985). Furthermore, these reforms had little legal force because the regulations for
applying them were never published (Thogmartin, 1998).
12 From 1944 to 1957, the AFP could be considered a state-run agency. The news
agency obtained its independence in 1957, while the State continued to provide more
than half of the agency’s revenues (through purchase subscriptions).
13 All details of these data sources as well as descriptive statistics on newspaper
political aﬃliation are available in the online Appendix Section A.1.6.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the local daily newspapers in 1946 and 1949, depending on their political aﬃliation. Notes: The ﬁgure plots the distributions of the local daily newspapers
in France in 1946 (Fig. 1a) and in 1949 (Fig. 1b) depending on their political aﬃliation. The blue bars (left y-axis) report the number of newspapers, and the red bars (right y-
axis) their total circulation. The “Right” category gathers together newspapers from the Right, the “Parti Républicain de la Liberté” (PRL), the “Républicains Indépendants” (in
1946), the “Modérés” (in 1949), as well as Catholic newspapers. The “Radical Socialists” category gathers together the Radicals, the “Rassemblement des gauches”, and the “Union
Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance” (UDSR). “Information” corresponds to the newspapers without political aﬃliation. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Source: The data come from the “Répartition politique de la presse” (political distribution of the press) ﬁles: box F41bis 2089 of the French Ministry of Information archives.
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indications on the ﬁnancial situation, political or denominational ten-
dency, private life of themanagers, etc.” of the newspapers. The reports
were commissioned by the Ministry of Information in the 1960s and
the 1970s, and are stored in the National Archives.
Online Appendix Fig. A.8 shows the distribution of the news-
papers depending on their political stance and on the strength of
their bias. One third of the newspapers (29 out of 86) can be con-
sidered completely neutral and unbiased during this time period.
While 26 newspapers have a right-wing editorial stance, this bias
tends to be relatively weak. On the contrary, the 9 newspapers with a
Communist stance are strongly biased toward the Communist party.
Overall, three-quarters of the newspapers for which we have
information are independent or have a weak political stance by the
end of the 1970s. The vast majority of the newspapers can be con-
sidered commercial newspapers willing to maximize their proﬁts.
Furthermore, this tendency has increased in recent decades, and the
Fifth Republic local daily news industry can basically be character-
ized by the independence of the newspapers with respect to the
political parties.
Finally, in the online Appendix Section C, I describe a number
of governance innovations (such as workers’ cooperative produc-
tion societies and “societies of journalists”) that characterized the
post-WWII newspaper industry but came to an end in the 1980s. In
the rest of this section, I describe the new dataset I build for this
study.
2.2. News industry characteristics
My sample includes 287 local daily newspapers over the 1944–
2014 period. These newspapers are general information newspapers
that offer a mix of soft and hard news topics. On average, about two
thirds of the space in these newspapers is devoted to soft news (one
third to hard news) but this ratio can vary widely (Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics on newspaper content). The average newspaper
issue contains 421 articles of relatively small length (286 words per
article). The size of newspapers is one of my proxies for quality. The
other proxy I use is the number of journalists on staff. On average,
59 journalists work in each newspaper (Table 2 provides descriptive
statistics on papers’ costs, revenues and the size of the newsroom).
Overall, the local daily newspaper industry generated €2.3 billion
in total revenues in 2014 (the last year of my sample), nearly four
times more than the national daily newspaper industry (€632 mil-
lion). It represents nearly 30% of the total revenues generated by the
print media industry (€7.74 billion14). 66% of these revenues come
from sales and 34% from advertisement. Its total circulation is around
4.4 million copies a day, compared to 883,000 for the national daily
newspaper industry.
To get a sense of how important these circulation numbers are,
it is useful to present them in terms of market penetration. The nat-
ural news market for a local daily newspaper in France is a county;
there are 87 counties in metropolitan France excluding the area of
Paris.15 On average, there are 2.7 newspapers per county and the
total newspaper circulation in a county is around 80,000 copies,
14 I.e. 0.36% of the GDP. In comparison, according to the Newspaper Association of
America (NAA), the US newspaper media industry generated $37.6 billion in total rev-
enues in 2013, i.e. 0.22% of the GDP (in 2014, the NAA stopped releasing industry-wide
revenue data).
15 In my analysis, I exclude the Paris area. In this area, local daily newspapers are
indeed competing in a different way with national newspapers. Given that Paris has a
national dimension, a lot of “local” information concerning the area of Paris is covered
in national newspapers. So there is much more competition between the different
newspapers than in the rest of France, and it would be misleading to consider only
competition between local newspapers.
Table 1
Summary statistics of newspaper content (2005–2012).
Mean/sd Mean/sd Mean/sd
Number of words per front page 370
(222)
Number of articles in the newspaper 421
(302)
Number of words in the newspaper 107,044
(83,165)
Average article length 286
(40)
Share of articles on hard news 34.8
(13.4)
Share of articles on soft news 66.5
(11.5)
Share of words on hard news 32.7
(13.9)
Share of words on soft news 68.6
(11.9)
Newspaper specialization (Herﬁndhal Index) 0.17
(0.13)
Observations 94,901 30,503 28,180
Notes: The table gives summary statistics for newspapers’ content. It presents the
average and the standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variables. Variables are
values for newspapers. Time period is 2005–2012. The share of articles on hard news
is deﬁned as the number of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environ-
ment, international affairs or politics, divided by the total number of articles I classify.
The share of articles on soft news is deﬁned as the number of articles on movies,
culture, leisure activities, sports, “news in brief”, religion or health, divided by the
total number of articles I classify. Newspaper specialization is an Herﬁndahl index of
newspaper differentiation. The Herﬁndahl index is equal to the sum of the squares
of the shares of the different newspaper topics in each newspaper issue: agricul-
ture, culture, economics, education, environment, health, international affairs, leisure
activities, movies, “news in brief”, politics, religion and sports.
representing 24% of the eligible voters (see Table 3 which presents
summary statistics on newspaper circulation). Given that the aver-
age ratio of reported readership to circulation is 3, this implies that
nearly three-quarters of the eligible voters in a county read a local
daily newspaper. Therefore, the issue of how changes in the news-
market structure affect the provision of information by daily local
newspapers is key. Although there is a downward trend in circulation
over the period 1944–2014, the total circulation of local newspapers
has always been extremely large. The number of copies sold every-
day ranges from 15 to 35% of the eligible voters during my period of
interest.16
Given the high circulation across nearby counties — between
1944 and 2014, 42.7% of the local daily newspapers circulated in
more than one county, and these newspapers circulated on aver-
age across 4 counties17 — my main variables of interest are at the
newspaper–county level.
2.2.1. Newspaper entries and exits
The central independent variable in my analysis is the change
in the number of newspapers. My sample includes 703 newspaper–
county pairs. I observe a total of 356 county-years with net news-
paper entry and 355 county-years with net newspaper exit. Fig. 2
shows for each year the number of counties with net newspaper
entry (Fig. 2a) and the number of counties with net newspaper
exit (Fig. 2b). The high number of entries and exits between 1944
and 1955 is a result of the Second World War. As noted above,
the wartime period marked an almost wholly clean break with
the prewar media system. When I exclude this post-war period
(1944–1954), I am left with a total of 96 county-years with net
16 See the online Appendix Fig. B.5. This ratio was above 35% only for a few years
following WWII.
17 More detailed summary statistics on the circulation of newspapers across counties
are available in the online Appendix Section B.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of newspapers’ costs, revenues and newsroom.
Mean Median Sd Min Max
Total revenues (thsd €) 43,708 17,563 56,930 6 356,065
Revenues from sales (thsd €) 24,910 9,738 33,521 3 215,486
Revenues from advertising (thsd €) 18,621 7,026 25,552 0 331,169
Total expenditures (thsd €) 41,457 16,975 54,830 15 354,208
Number of journalists 59 28 76 1 563
Journalists’ average monthly salary (€) 2,615 2,662 701 743 5,376
Notes: The table gives summary statistics for newspapers’ revenues, expenses and number of journalists. The time period is 1960–2014, expect for the number of journalists
(1944–2014). Variables are values for newspapers. Variables are at the newspaper/year level. All variables (excepted the number of journalists and their average monthly salary)
are in (constant 2014) thousand euros. Journalists’ average monthly salary is in (constant 2014) euros.
Table 3
Summary statistics of newspapers’ circulation (1944–2014).
(1) (2) (3)
Mean/sd Mean/sd Mean/sd
County-level variables
Total county circulation (# copies) 79,597
(84,751)
County circulation per eligible voter (%) 24.2
(16.8)
Average number of newspapers in a county 2.7
(1.5)
Newspaper * county-level variables
Newspaper circulation per county (# copies) 32,769
(43,980)
Newspaper circulation per county and eligible voter (%) 9.9
(10.8)
Newspaper-level variables
Total circulation (# copies) 82,662
(117,599)
Notes: The table gives summary statistics for newspapers’ circulation. It presents the average and the standard
deviations (in parentheses) of the variables. The time period is 1944–2014. Variables are at the county/year level in
column 1, at the newspaper/county/year level in column 2, and at the newspaper/year level in column 3.
newspaper entry and 228 county-years with net newspaper exit.18
The entering newspapers are either new newspapers entering the
newspaper market from scratch (in 24% of cases19) or existing news-
papers entering a neighboring market. Importantly, in more than
83% of cases, newspapers in a given market are owned by different
owners.
Given that entries and exits are key for my identiﬁcation strategy,
it is critical to understand the forces that cause them. The existing
literature suggest two primary determinants of the number of news-
papers in a market: income and population (see e.g. Gentzkow et al.,
2011). As I underline above, newspapers have ﬁxed costs, so market
size is a major determinant of the number of newspapers in a mar-
ket (Berry, 1992; Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). In the online Appendix
Table E.1, I provide evidence that the market size is a good predictor
of the number of active newspapers, and that newspapers move in
where there is a trending population.
2.2.2. Newspaper data
I now brieﬂy describe the news dataset I have constructed for
this paper. I discuss further details of the construction of the data
in the online Appendix (Section A). Those readers who feel unin-
terested in these technical details may want to go directly to
Section 2.3.
18 Section B in the online Appendix presents a more detailed overview of this data.
19 85 out of the 356 county-years with net newspaper entry I observe come from
these new newspapers. Of these 85 cases, 71 are caused by new newspaper owners
entering the local daily newspaper industry.
2.2.2.1. Newspaper circulation, costs and revenues. To determine for
each year between 1944 and 2014 the number of newspapers
present in each French county, I use various sources of information
(e.g. oﬃcial registries) that I digitize and merge. I count local daily
newspapers from these sources: in each year, I extract the name
and the counties in which every local daily newspaper circulates. I
match newspapers across time using their title and counties. For each
county-year, I also compute the number of local daily newspapers
which serves as my key explanatory variable.
For the period 1944–1989, newspaper circulation data comes
from oﬃcial data I digitize and merge. Data for recent years (1990–
2014) comes from the French press observatory. For each newspaper,
I have annual information not only on their total circulation but
also — for newspapers circulating across nearby counties — on their
circulation in each of the counties in which they circulate.
For local daily newspapers between 1960 and 2014, I compute
annually a number of important economic indicators, namely total
operating revenues that I can split between revenues from sales
and revenues from advertising, and total operating expenses. This
dataset is, to the extent ofmy knowledge, themost complete existing
dataset on newspapers’ costs and revenues. I collect data covering
the period 1960–1974 from the archives of the Ministry of Infor-
mation. Between 1960 and 1974, French newspapers were asked
by the Ministry of Information to report annually on circulation,
expenditures and revenues. From 1984 to 201420, the data comes
20 Unfortunately, no data is available for the period 1975–1983. However, I collect
annual data on the number of journalists for the entire 1944–2014 period (see below).
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Fig. 2. Number of counties with net newspaper entry/net newspaper exit by year.Notes: The ﬁgure shows for each year the number of counties with net newspaper entry (Fig. 2a)
and the number of counties with net newspaper exit (Fig. 2b).
from the Enterprise Survey of the French National Institute of Statis-
tics (INSEE). I identify newspapers in the dataset using the French
registry of establishments and enterprises. For the newspapers not
covered in the Enterprise Survey, I use information from the Bureau
van Dijk’s websites (in particular ORBIS).
Given that my analysis is at the newspaper–county level, I need
to construct newspaper-county-level values of the variables. This is
simple when the only newspapers circulating in a county are head-
quartered in this county and do not circulate outside. It is more
problematic when a newspaper circulates across nearby counties. In
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this case, I use data on the geographical dispersion of circulation;
for each newspaper, I assign to the counties in which it circulates
a percentage of the value of the variable (e.g. total revenues from
sales, operating expenses,. . . ) equal to its share of the newspaper
circulation.21
2.2.2.2. Size of the newsroom. I collect annual data on the number of
journalists at the newspaper level from the non-publicly available
paper records of the “Commission de la carte d’identité des jour-
nalistes professionnels” (the organization that issues press cards to
journalists). These data are from Cagé (2016). For each of the local
daily newspapers, I know the number of journalists (including both
monthly-paid salaried workers and freelancers) on an annual basis
from 1944 to 2014. I also compute information on each journal-
ist’s annual compensation, i.e. their monthly gross salary from 1960
to 2014. To the extent of my knowledge, this is an unprecedented
dataset on newspapers’ newsrooms.
The number of journalists on staff can be considered a relevant
proxy for newspaper quality, even though other important factors
enter into the news production function. In particular, local daily
newspapers tend to rely very much on wire dispatches for national
and international news. Roughly all the newspapers subscribe to the
AFP duringmy period of interest, however, and the subscription price
they are charged depends on their circulation (see e.g. Baron, 2014).
Hence, from an estimation point of view, the existence of the AFP
is not a threat to my empirical strategy, which includes year and
newspaper ﬁxed effect.
2.2.2.3. Newspaper content. I supplement this data for recent years
with measures of newspaper content, in particular of the size of
newspapers. I use three different measures of size. First, for each
newspaper issue, I count the number of words by front page. Front
pages are available daily for 51 newspapers over the period 2006–
2012. I download them from the local daily press syndicate website
using an automated script.22
Second, I collect data on the entire daily content of each news-
paper by using an automated script to retrieve for each day all the
articles published in the newspaper. I download the data from two
different websites which aggregate content from newspapers (Fac-
tiva and Lexis-Nexis). I construct a dataset covering 22 different
newspapers over the period 2005–2012 with information on the
total number of articles and the total number of words per issue.
Finally, I use the metadata (tag) associated with each article on
Lexis-Nexis (title, subject, topic) to classify articles as hard news or
soft news. The share of articles on hard news is deﬁned as the num-
ber of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environment,
international affairs or politics, divided by the total number of arti-
cles I am able to classify. The share of articles on soft news is deﬁned
as the number of articles onmovies, culture, leisure activities, sports,
“news in brief” (faits divers), religion or health, divided by the total
number of articles I am able to classify.
2.3. Local elections and demographic controls
The focus of this paper is on local (city-level) elections (the so-
called “élections municipales”). As of today, there are 36,570 cities
in metropolitan France. There are 2,282 towns and cities with more
than 3,500 inhabitants outside the area of Paris. I focus on these cities
over 3,500 inhabitants since the electoral rule for local elections for
21 I show that the results are robust to rather assigning to each county an equal share
of the variable of interest.
22 Using front pages is not new in literature for this ﬁeld (see e.g. Di Tella and
Franceschelli, 2011).
towns with fewer than 3,500 inhabitants is different. For each elec-
tion, I measure turnout as the ratio of cast votes to eligible voters in
the ﬁrst round of the election. I use cast votes rather than total votes
since in France blank votes are not included in turnout.
Local elections take place in France every six years. Between 1944
and 2014, 12 elections took place: 1947, 1953, 1959, 1965, 1971,
1977, 1983, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2008, and 2014.23 Before 1983, data on
French local elections have never been digitized. I construct the ﬁrst
electronically available dataset on French local elections results at
municipal level between 1944 and 1982, using oﬃcial data sources in
paper format. More recent data are available in digitized format from
the Centre de Données Socio-Politiques (CDSP) of Science-Po Paris, the
Interior Ministry, and Bach (2011). Not all municipalities have data
for all years, and I include municipalities if they have turnout data
available for a majority of the years from 1947 to 2014.
2.3.1. Local elections and local news
Note that while newspapers enter/exit at the county level, the
entry/exit “treatment” can be applied to towns. French local daily
newspapers indeed provide in-depth municipal-level coverage of
local news stories. First, newspapers publish several local editions:
eight on average (online Appendix Fig. B.6). Moreover, most of them
also have local news desks. The average number of news desks
for the local daily newspapers in 2014 is 8.4 (online Appendix Fig.
B.7). In other words, local daily newspapers in France, despite being
county-based, provide in-depth municipal-level coverage.
2.3.2. Demographic controls
Finally, I collect municipal-level demographic data. Demographic
data from the French census is available in electronic format from
1962 to 2014. I digitize data for the 1936, 1946 and 1954 censuses
from original paper publications by the French National Institute
of Statistics. I compute the share of the population by age group,
occupation and degree. For each measure, I interpolate both the
numerator and denominator between census years using a natural
cubic spline (Herriot and Reinsch, 1973) and divide the two to obtain
an estimate of the relevant share.
3. Newspaper competition and news quality
In this section, I study how newspaper quality varies with the
market structure. To measure empirically the quality of newspapers,
I follow the existing literature and use the number of journalists on
staff (see e.g. Hamilton, 2004; Berry andWaldfogel, 2010; Fan, 2013;
Angelucci and Cagé, 2019; Cagé et al., 2017). The advantage of this
measure is that it allowsme to use the panel dimension of the dataset
to exploit the timing of entries and exits for identiﬁcation. My second
proxy for quality is “quantity” — the size of newspapers. Indeed, con-
sumers presumably always prefermore content to less. I use quantity
to estimate both the impact of competition on newspaper quality
and on the type of news produced — hard versus soft news. I perform
this analysis taking a reduced-form approach. I use all the variations
in the data from n > 0 to n + 1 newspapers.
3.1. Empirical strategy
The main empirical challenge is to isolate the impact of entries
and exits on incumbent newspapers. My identiﬁcation strategy relies
on the timing of these events. I estimate the effect of the entry (or
exit) of a newspaper by comparing counties that experience an entry
(or exit) to similar counties in the same year that do not. Given that
23 A mayoral election also took place in 1945. I choose not to include it in the dataset
since this election took place before the end of the Second World War in very special
conditions and just two years before the 1947 election.
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the entry decision is made to maximize proﬁts, counties that expe-
rience an entry are likely to differ from other counties, both at the
time of entry and in future periods. The identifying assumption is
that newspapers in these other counties form a valid counterfactual
for the incumbent newspapers in counties that experience an entry,
after conditioning for differences in preexisting trends, newspaper
ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, and a large set of demographic covari-
ates controlling for the age composition, occupational structure and
educational level of counties. I provide evidence below that entries
are orthogonal to the outcomes I study: there are no pre-trends in
circulation, revenues, expenses and the number of journalists before
entries (Section 3.2).24
Given the existence of treatment and control counties with a
common underlying trend, I can quantify the entry effect that
induces a sharp deviation from this trend. As underlined above,
between 1944 and 2014, I observe a total of 356 county-years with
net entry and 355 county-years with net exit, and a total of 96
county-years with net entry and 228 county-years with net exit
when I drop the post-war period.
3.2. The effect of newspaper entry on circulation
To start with, I use my panel data on newspaper competition
and track the impact of a change in competition on newspapers’ cir-
culation. I study how a change in the number of newspapers in a
county affects (i) the circulation of incumbent newspapers (per eligi-
ble voter) in the county; and (ii) the total newspaper circulation (per
eligible voter) in the county. I estimate alternatively aggregate event
studies and a ﬁxed-effect model that allows for time-varying effects
of entries and exits.
3.2.1. Aggregate event studies
The event of an entry (alternatively an exit) is the cross-sectional
dimension and the years around the event are the temporal dimen-
sion of my panel. In the case of an entry, incumbent newspapers
are deﬁned as the newspapers circulating in the county the year
before the entry. I study how the circulation of these newspapers is
affected by the introduction of a new newspaper. Business stealing
corresponds to a decrease in the circulation of incumbent newspa-
pers. In the case of an exit, incumbent newspapers are deﬁned as the
newspapers circulating in the county the year before the exit except
the newspaper which exits. The exit of a newspaper should either
increase or have no effect on the circulation of incumbent newspa-
pers. The analysis is robust to summing the variables of interest over
incumbent newspapers or to consider each incumbent newspaper
separately (in which case the cross-sectional dimension is the inter-
action of an event and a newspaper). I present the results here using
the sum over incumbents.
I study the effect of newspaper entry and exit separately since the
impact of entry and exit on circulation may not be symmetrical.25
3.2.2. Newspaper entry
I ﬁrst consider newspaper entry. Let c index counties, e index
entry events, t index calendar years and j index event periods. By
normalization, entry takes place in j = 0. The outcome of interest,
24 Orthogonality may come from the fact that, in the spirit of a latent variable model
with threshold crossing, small increases in population create a discontinuity. While
entry is discontinuous, demographic characteristics indeed change smoothly.
25 There are some episodes during which there are simultaneously one (or more)
entry(ies) and one (or more) exit(s) in a given county a given year. When entry(ies)
and exit(s) cancel out I drop the episode. My results are robust to either considering
as entries the episodes during which there are more entries than exits (net entry) or
to dropping them. Similarly, they are robust to either considering episodes of net exit
as exit or dropping them.
circulationcte, is the (aggregate) circulation of incumbent newspa-
per(s) per eligible voter.
I estimate the following model:
circulationcte =
+10∑
k=−10
ak1j=kcte + X
′
ctd+ ct + gc + ecte (1)
where ct are year ﬁxed effects, gc county ﬁxed effects, and ecte is the
error term. The vector of controls X′ct includes the share of the popu-
lation with only secondary and vocational education diplomas, with
the (French) baccalaureate, and with higher (post-secondary) educa-
tion, the share of the population below 24, between 25 and 54, and
between 55 and 64years old, the share of the working population
made up of farmers, artisans, shopkeepers and company managers,
senior executives or knowledge workers, employees, and which has
intermediate occupations, and the total population in county c and
year t. Standard errors are clustered by events.
The set of coeﬃcients ak aremy coeﬃcients of interest.26 In Fig. 3,
I ﬁrst plot these coeﬃcients ak for the entire period 1944–2014.
The dependent variable is total circulation (per eligible voter) in the
upper ﬁgure (Fig. 3a) and the circulation of incumbent newspapers
(per eligible voter) in the bottom ﬁgure (Fig. 3b). Two things need
to be underlined. First, whether I consider total county circulation
or circulation of incumbent newspapers, there is no pre-trend before
the entry. All the ak coeﬃcients before the event are not statistically
signiﬁcant and the point estimates are close to zero. Second, despite
the fact that there is some market expansion — the total circulation
per capita increases by around 5 percentage points (Fig. 3a) — we
observe a strong and permanent business-stealing effect (Fig. 3b).
The circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter decreases
by more than 6 percentage points after entry, which corresponds to
a 20% decrease.27
Given the speciﬁcity of the post-war period, I show in the online
Appendix Fig. E.1 that these results are robust — albeit of a smaller
magnitude — to only considering the post-1960 period. This also
corresponds to the time period for which I have the newspapers’ rev-
enue and expenditure data. As an additional robustness check, I only
consider as entry episodes the cases of entry of existing newspa-
pers (already operating in neighboring markets at the time of entry).
Online Appendix Fig. E.2 presents the results. While we observe a
slight increase in the standard errors (due to the lower number of
episodes), reducing my sample of entries to the episodes of entry by
existing newspapers does not affect my main results.
3.2.3. Newspaper exit
Does an exit symmetrically increase the circulation of remain-
ing newspapers? I estimate Eq. (1) considering only episodes of
exit. Online Appendix Fig. E.5 shows the coeﬃcients ak from this
estimation for the period 1960–2014 controlling for demographics.
Contrary to what we observe for entries, the magnitude of the effects
for exits is very small. This difference in magnitude may come from
the fact that while newspapers enter large, they exit small (the cir-
culation of exiting newspapers follows a decreasing trend before
exit).28 We observe an increasing trend in the circulation of incum-
bent newspapers before exit. Incumbent newspapers recover the
circulation of the exiting newspaper even before the actual exit of the
26 Years around the event go from −10 to +10 but results are robust to the use of
other time intervals. Results are also robust to estimating themodel in ﬁrst differences
rather than in level.
27 Between 1944 and 2014, the average circulation of incumbent newspapers per
eligible voter the year before an entry is 30%.
28 On average, circulation in the year of entry is equal to 116% of a newspaper’s life-
time average circulation; circulation in the last year before exit is equal to 75% of the
lifetime average.
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Fig. 3. Impact of newspaper entry on newspapers’ circulation (1944–2014), controlling for demographics. Notes: The ﬁgures show coeﬃcients from a regression of circulation on
a vector of year dummies going from −10 to +10 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see Eq. (1) for details). In Fig. 3a, the dependent variable is total county circulation
per eligible voter. In Fig. 3b, the dependent variable is the circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter. Models include year and county ﬁxed effects and demographic
controls. Error bars are ±2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time period is 1944–2014.
newspaper. The existence of a pre-trend in the circulation of incum-
bent newspapers before an exit makes the event-study approach less
relevant for the analysis of the effect of exits (contrary to entries). In
the next section I will thus focus on the impact of entry on incumbent
newspapers.
3.3. The effect of newspaper entry on the size of the newsroom
How does the market structure affect the size of the newsroom?
To answer this question, I use my panel of newspaper economic indi-
cators that covers the period 1944 to 2014. In particular, for each
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newspaper, I observe the number of journalists on an annual basis
as well as, for the sub-period 1960–2014, journalists’ compensation,
i.e., their monthly gross salary. I study how the entry of a newspaper
into the market affects the value of these outcomes for incumbent
newspapers.
3.3.1. Aggregate event studies
In Fig. 4, I plot the coeﬃcients ak that I obtain by estimating Eq.
(1) with, as before, a −10 to +10 window. The dependent variable
is the total number of journalists working in the county in the upper
ﬁgure (Fig. 4a) and the number of journalists working for incumbent
newspapers in the bottom ﬁgure (Fig. 4b).
If we ﬁrst consider the number of journalists working for incum-
bent newspapers, it appears clearly that there is no pre-trend. The
negative effect of entry happens on impact and persists over time
(similarly to what happens for circulation). I ﬁnd that the number
of journalists working for incumbent newspapers decreases by 4 to
8.5 after an entry. Table D.1 in the online Appendix presents descrip-
tive statistics for incumbent newspapers the year preceding an entry.
The total number of journalists working for incumbent newspapers
is on average equal to 44. The entry of a newspaper thus leads to
a decrease of around 19% of the size of the newsroom of incum-
bent newspapers. This decrease was expected given the decrease in
incumbent newspapers’ circulation.
Although small in terms of magnitude, one may be surprised by
the on-impact decrease in the number of journalists. This may be due
to the decision of the entrant newspaper to poach journalists from
the incumbent newspaper (and therefore of journalists to quit the
incumbent newspapers without being encouraged to do so). Given
the importance of local coverage for local daily newspapers, it would
make perfect sense for the entrant newspaper to choose such a strat-
egy. Faced with a decrease in its circulation (as shown above), the
incumbent newspaper may decide not to hire a new journalist as a
replacement.
Interestingly, the drop in the size of the newsroom seems indeed
to come from the fact that, when there is an entry, a number of jour-
nalists working for the incumbent newspaper(s) go and work for the
entrant. Indeed, I ﬁnd nearly no change in the total number of jour-
nalists working in the county after an entry (Fig. 4a). Consistently
with this intuition, I show that, in the entry year, the average com-
pensation of the journalists working for the entrant newspaper(s) is
typically 5.5% higher than in the incumbent newspaper(s).29
One can use the journalist dataset constructed by Cagé (2016) in
order to illustrate this phenomena with some informative anecdo-
tal evidence. Consider the example of the newspaper L’Union which
circulates in the Marne county. In 1981, L’Union, which was at the
time in amonopolistic situation in the county, faced the entry of L’Est
Républicain. While 115 journalists were working for L’Union before
the entry, there were only 110 in 1982–1983, 108 in 1984, 93 in 1985
and 84 in 1987, i.e. a 31-journalist drop within the six years follow-
ing the shock. I ﬁnd that 10 of them went to work for the entrant,
L’Est Républicain. Obviously, this does not mean that there was a
one-to-one transfer from the incumbent to the entrant newspaper. A
number of journalists simply quit journalism at the time. Some jour-
nalists also left L’Union to ﬁnd a job in a newspaper other than L’Est
Républicain. But it is of interest to see that to some extent there is a
split both in the size of the newsroom and in the circulation due to
the business-stealing effect.
29 The average compensation of the journalists working for the entrant is not always
higher than that of the journalists working for the incumbent newspaper(s). However,
there are more entry years when it is higher than years when it is lower. Moreover,
the absolute magnitude of the difference is larger when the difference is positive (i.e.
when the average entrant compensation is higher). See online Appendix Fig. E.6.
As a robustness check, I reduce my sample of interest to those
newspapers facing an entry in the county in which they are head-
quartered. In this case, for each newspaper, rather than assigning
to the counties in which it circulates a percentage of the newsroom
equal to its share of the newspaper circulation, I consider its total
number of journalists. I perform the analysis at the newspaper level.
Hence I estimate the following model:
circulationnte =
+10∑
k=−10
jk1j=knte + X
′
ctd+ ct + vn + ente (2)
where ct are year ﬁxed effects, but I now control for newspaper ﬁxed
effects (vn). Online Appendix Fig. E.7 plots the coeﬃcients j
k for
two different left-hand side variables: the total number of journalists
working for the incumbent newspapers and the average journalist
compensation of these journalists. If we ﬁrst consider the number of
journalists, it is reassuring to observe that, as for the previous spec-
iﬁcation, there is no pre-trend before entry. Moreover, we observe a
statistically signiﬁcant drop in the size of the newsroom after entry.
In terms of magnitude, the number of journalists decreases by 2.5
on impact, and by 8.3 ten years after the entry. On average, newspa-
pers facing an entry in the county in which they are headquartered
employ 85 journalists the year preceding the entry. In other words,
the decrease in the size of the newsroom they suffer is on average
nearly 10% ten years after the shock.
What are the characteristics of the journalists leaving the incum-
bent newspapers? To provide some elements of response to this
question, I compute the average journalists’ compensation. I ﬁnd no
change in journalists’ monthly salary around the time of the entry
(online Appendix Fig. E.7b). This may be due to the fact that both the
(mainly younger and less experienced) newcomers and the oldest
journalists (at the age of retirement) leave, so that on average there
is no change in the average compensation paid. Such a hypothesis is
consistent with the fact that there is no change in the average age
of the journalists working for the incumbent newspaper around the
time of entry (online Appendix Fig. E.8a). I also investigate the extent
to which entry affects the share of womenworking in the newsroom.
The effects are small and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level
for only a subset of the post-shock years, but if anything I do ﬁnd that
the share of women working in incumbent newspapers’ newsrooms
decreases following the entry of a newcomer (online Appendix Fig.
E.8b).
I perform an additional robustness check to ensure that the drop
in the number of journalists does not happen “by construction” for
those newspapers circulating across counties (given that in this case
in the main speciﬁcation I allocate the number of journalists to the
different counties depending on the share of the newspaper’s circu-
lation in each county). Rather than computing a circulation-weighted
number of journalists, I simply allocate to each of the nth counties
in which the newspaper circulate 1n times its number of journal-
ists (i.e. for a newspaper with a 100-journalist newsroom circulating
across two counties, I attribute 50 journalists to each county). Online
Appendix Fig. E.3 presents the results. They are entirely consistent
with the ﬁndings of Figs. 4b and E.7a. On the one hand, there is
no change in the size of the newsroom before an entry. On the
other hand, there is a statistically signiﬁcant drop following the entry
which grows larger over time. If anything, the impact of the entry is
of higher magnitude.
3.3.2. Fixed effects model
I next show that these results are robust to estimating a ﬁxed
effects model. The ﬁxed effects model allows me to control for the
events of exit, and can be seen as a robustness check of my results.
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Fig. 4. Impact of newspaper entry on newspapers’ size of the newsroom, county-level analysis (1944–2014). Notes: The ﬁgures show coeﬃcients from a regression of the number
of journalists on a vector of year dummies going from −10 to +10 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see Eq. (1) for details). In Fig. 4a, the dependent variable is the
total number of journalists working in the county. In Fig. 4b, the dependent variable is the number of journalists working for incumbent newspapers. Models include year and
county ﬁxed effects, and demographic controls. Error bars are ±2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time period is 1944–2014.
Given the ﬁnding that the effect of an entry on both circulation
and the number of journalists grows larger over time, I allow for
time-varying effects of entry on outcomes (Laporte and Windmeijer,
2005). More precisely, to quantify the dynamics effects of the event
and control for lags and leads, I deﬁne indicator variables for different
years around the event and an indicator variable isolating the long-
run effect of the shock. My estimating equation is
ycnt =
+5∑
k=−2
bk1entry
j=k
ct +
+5∑
k=−2
ck1exit
j=k
ct +gt +qn +X
′
ctd+ ecnt (3)
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Table 4
The effect of entry on newspapers’ newsrooms, revenues and expenses (newspaper-level analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of journalists Total Sales Ad Total expenditures
1entryj=−2 −0.13 −0.07 −0.06 −0.12 −0.12
(0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19)
1entryj=−1 −0.21 −0.20 −0.21 −0.25 −0.26
(0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
1entryj=0 −0.35∗∗ −0.33* −0.33* −0.36∗∗ −0.39∗∗
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
1entryj=1 −0.35∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.40∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.40∗∗
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
1entryj=2 −0.35∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
1entryj=3 −0.38∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗ −0.31* −0.32∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
1entryj=4 −0.34∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.52∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
1entryj≥5 −0.32∗∗ −0.18 −0.07 −0.10 −0.18
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.57
Observations 11,492 7534 6560 6667 6594
Clusters (county) 87 87 87 87 87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1960–2014. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. The
dependent variables are in logarithm. All variables (except for the number of journalists) are in thousand (constant 2014) euros. Models include
year and newspaper ﬁxed effects and demographic controls. Variables are described in more details in the text.
∗ p<0.10.
∗∗ p<0.05.
∗∗∗ p<0.01.
where c indexes counties, n indexes newspapers and t indexes years.
1entry−2ct = 1 in the 2nd year before an entry; 1entry
−1
ct = 1 in the 1st
year before an entry; 1entry0ct = 1 the year of an entry; 1entry
1
ct = 1
in the 1st year after an entry;. . . ; and 1entry5ct = 1 in the 5th year
after an entry and all subsequent years. The base period is the years
before the entry, excluding the 2nd and 1st years before entry (i.e.
from t − 3 backwards). I control for a set of indicator variables for
exit 1exitj=kct that are deﬁned the same way.
30 The vector of controls
X′ct is the same as before. The dependent variable ycnt is alternatively
the logarithm of newspapers’ size of the newsroom, revenues (total,
from sales and from advertising) and total expenditures.
Table 4 presents the results for incumbent newspapers.31 For all
the dependent variables, I ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effect for
the pre-entry indicator variables 1entry−2 and 1entry−1. Moreover, as
expected given the results I obtain with the aggregate event studies
speciﬁcation, I ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact of
entry on the different outcomes of interest. For the number of jour-
nalists, the negative effect is statistically signiﬁcant beginning the
year of the entry (minus 35%) and then grows larger over time (minus
39% three years after entry). The long-term effect of entry on the
number of journalists (captured by the indicator variable 1entry5ct) is
minus 32% and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (column 1).
Reassuringly, results are of the same order of magnitude for the
other outcomes of interest (revenues and expenditures), in spite of
the less balanced data coverage. Total revenues decrease by 33% on
impact (column 2). This effect comes both from a decrease in rev-
enues from sales and in advertising revenues. We observe a similar
decrease in total expenditures (column 5). The negative effect is
30 To save on space, I only report the coeﬃcients for entry variables since they are
the only coeﬃcients of interest. Results are robust to controlling or not for the exit
indicator variables.
31 Given that the balance sheet data is only available from 1960, I report the results
for the 1960–2014 period for the sake of comparability. Consistently with the graphi-
cal evidence presented in the aggregate event study, results are robust to considering
the entire 1944–2014 for journalists, and are available upon demand.
statistically signiﬁcant for the four years following the entry; how-
ever the statistical signiﬁcance vanishes for the long-term effect
(1entry5ct).
Furthermore, while entry has a strong negative effect on each
individual newspaper’s revenues, expenses and number of jour-
nalists, I show in the online Appendix Table E.2 — in which the
dependent variables are values aggregated at the county level — that
it has no positive effect at the aggregate market level. There are no
statistically signiﬁcant changes in total county’s journalists, revenues
and expenses at the time of an entry nor in the following years. Given
the ﬁxed costs of news production, through the duplication of these
costs, the entry of a newspaper may lead to a decrease in the total
amount of news produced at the county level.
3.4. The effect of newspaper entry on the content of newspapers
3.4.1. The size of newspapers
How does the structure of the news market affect the quantity
of news produced by newspapers? I cannot estimate as before the
impact of the entry of a newspaper given the fact that I only have
data on newspaper content for recent years (2005–2012). I thus sim-
ply estimate the impact of the number of newspapers on the size
of newspapers using a cross-sectional approach. A potential issue is
that there may be selection in the cross-section. Reassuringly, the
results of the previous section are robust to such an approach.
Let c index counties, d index the date (in days), t index year and n
index newspapers. I assume that
sizentd = a1 + a2Nnct + X′cta3 + lt + enctd (4)
where Nnct is the number of newspapers in year t in the county c in
which the newspaper n is headquartered, X′ct is a vector of observable
characteristics, lt is a year ﬁxed effect and enctd is a newspaper-
county-date-year shock. sizentd, my key dependent variable of inter-
est, is the size of the newspaper. I compute three different indicators
of the size: (i) the number of articles by newspaper; (ii) the total
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number of words by newspaper; (iii) the total number of words on
the newspaper front page. To adjust standard errors for possible
dependence in residuals, I cluster them at the county-year level.
Table 5 shows the impact of the number of newspapers on the
size of newspapers. In column 1, I consider the total number of arti-
cles in the newspaper, in column 2 the total number of words, and in
column 3 the total number of words on the front page. I ﬁnd that the
number of articles in a newspaper statistically signiﬁcantly decreases
with the number of newspapers on themarket: one additional news-
paper decreases the number of articles by 178, a 42% decrease. The
total number of words decreases by 53% and the number of words on
the front page by 16%.
3.4.2. The type of news produced
I now investigate how the content of newspapers (hard vs.
soft news) varies with the market structure. Classifying newspa-
per content into hard and soft news is an empirical challenge per
se, especially because there are “news hybrids” and because what
is informative in the political process for one citizen may not be
for another. I consider as hard news articles which are informative
for the reader at the time of the elections, even if they sometimes
incorporate elements from entertainment. In contrast, soft news is
non-informative in the political process.
In order to study the distribution of articles by topic, I use the
information provided by the website Lexis-Nexis. When I retrieve
the content of newspapers, I also retrieve all the metadata associ-
ated with each newspaper article, and in particular its title, topic
and subject. Combining information from the title, topic and sub-
ject, I determine the category of each article. I create 13 different
categories: agriculture, culture, economics, education, environment,
health, international affairs, leisure activities, movies, “news in brief”
(faits divers), politics, religion and sports. I deﬁne the share of hard
news articles as the number of articles on agriculture, economics,
education, environment, international affairs or politics, divided by
the total number of articles classiﬁed by topics. Symmetrically, I
deﬁne the share of soft news articles as the number of articles on
culture, health, leisure activities, movies, “news in brief”, religion or
sports, divided by the total number of articles classiﬁed by topics.
I then estimate Eq. (4) with the share of hard news articles, the
number of hard news articles and the number of soft news articles
as my dependent variables of interest. Columns 4 to 6 of Table 5
present the results. I ﬁnd that the share of articles on hard news
decreases with the number of newspapers on the market (column
4). An increase of one in the number of newspapers decreases the
share of articles on hard news by around 2.6 percentage points, a
7.7% decrease. This decline comes from a decrease in the number of
articles on hard news: in column 5, I show that an increase of one
in the number of newspapers decreases the number of articles on
hard news by 81. I also ﬁnd that the number of articles on soft news
decreases with the number of newspapers.
4. Competition and news production: mechanisms
In the previous section, I have documented a negative relation-
ship between increased competition and the circulation and quality
of newspapers. In this section I examine a number of theoretical
mechanisms that may drive these empirical ﬁndings. I ﬁrst consider
the post-war period and discuss the importance of media capture in
a context in which most newspapers were politically biased. I then
turn to the most recent period characterized by nonpartisan report-
ing. I lay out a simple vertical product differentiation framework, and
interact empirically the effect of market structure with the degree of
heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay.
4.1. Competition, capture, and the extent of media bias
As detailed in the historical background Section 2.1, the post-
war period can be considered the golden age of the partisan press
in France. During this period, to the extent that the newspapers that
were the organ of political parties did not care about the size of the
audience, an increase in competition may have led to an increase in
the bias — in particular through a drop in advertising revenues — and
to a decline in readers’ willingness-to-pay, as predicted by Petrova
(2012).
I ﬁrst investigate whether the negative impact of competition on
circulation and the size of the newsroom still hold if we focus on the
Fourth Republic period. Online Appendix Fig. E.9 estimates model (1)
for the Fourth Republic sub-period (1944–1958). The overall pattern
is similar to that presented in Fig. 3 using the entire time period. If
anything, the magnitude of the drop in the circulation of incumbent
newspapers is larger in the post-war period.
One possible explanation for this decline in circulation is a
decrease in consumers’ willingness-to-pay produced by an increase
in bias. The existing data do not allowme to measure empirically the
extent to which incumbent newspapers have increased their slant
in response to the increase in competition. However, to investigate
whether this mechanism may drive my results, I can use the infor-
mation on newspapers’ partisan aﬃliation I collect from the National
Table 5
The effect of the number of newspapers on newspaper content.
Nb articles Nb words Nb words front page Share hard news Nb hard news Nb soft news
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of newspapers −177.8*,∗∗∗ −56,295.7∗∗∗ −60.2∗∗∗ −2.6∗∗ −81.2∗∗∗ −133.8∗∗∗
(17.8) (5284.3) (16.1) (1.0) (11.8) (20.9)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-sq 0.70 0.69 0.18 0.22 0.57 0.59
Observations 27,708 30,502 94,901 25,745 27,170 27,291
Clusters (county-year) 106 106 274 88 94 94
Mean DepVar 421 107,044 370 34 91 166
Sd DepVar 302 83,165 222 11 89 139
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county-year. Time period is 2005–2012. Models are estimated using OLS. In column 1, the dependent variable is the number
of articles per newspaper; in column 2, the number of words per newspaper; in column 3, the number of words per newspaper front page; in column 4, the share of articles on
hard news which is deﬁned as the number of articles on agriculture, economics, education, environment, international or politics, divided by the total number of articles classiﬁed
by topics; in column 5, the number of articles on hard news; and in column 6, the number of articles on soft news. Models include year ﬁxed effects and demographic controls.
Variables are described in more details in the text.
∗ p<0.10.
∗∗ p<0.05.
∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Fig. 5. Impact of newspaper entry on incumbent newspapers’ circulation and on the size of the newsroom: The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958, depending on the political bias.
Notes: The ﬁgures show coeﬃcients from a regression of circulation on a vector of year dummies going from −5 to +5 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see Eq. (1)
for details). In the upper Fig. 5a and b, the dependent variable is the circulation of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter. In the bottom Fig. 5c and d, the dependent variable
is the number of journalists working for the incumbent newspapers. The “Partisan newspaper” sample includes all the incumbent newspapers that were partisan newspapers in
1950. The “No political aﬃliation” sample includes all the incumbent newspapers that were “information” newspapers (without political aﬃliation) in 1950. Models include year
and county ﬁxed effects and demographic controls. Error bars are ±2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time period is 1944–1958.
Archives. While straight after the Libération almost all the newspa-
pers were politically-aﬃliated, the partisan-reporting decline began
at the end of the 1940s. Hence, one may expect that the newspapers
that were still politically-aﬃliated in 1950 were also the most likely
to further increase their bias following a newspaper entry. In other
words, one can expect the drop in circulation generated by entry to
be larger for biased newspapers.
I split my sample between newspapers that were partisan news-
papers in 1950 and “information” newspapers (without political
aﬃliation).32 Fig. 5 shows the results. The upper ﬁgures Fig. 5a
and Fig. 5b report the impact of entry on the circulation of incum-
bent newspapers. While this impact is negative both for politically-
aﬃliated and for information newspapers, the decline is particularly
strong for partisan newspapers. We also observe a larger drop in the
32 The results are not driven by the choice of 1950 as a base year, and still hold when
I use earlier or later reference years.
size of the newsroom for partisan newspapers (Fig. 5d) than for infor-
mation newspapers (Fig. 5c); however in this case the difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings alone do not demonstrate that the extent of media
capture is themain driver ofmy empirical results, and they should be
taken with a grain of salt. However, they point toward such a mech-
anism for the Fourth Republic period, and are consistent with the
predictions of Petrova (2012) in the context of an underdeveloped
advertising market.
4.2. Competition on quality and consumers’ heterogeneity
The Fifth Republic marked the end of biased coverage for local
newspapers in France. In a context where newspapers deliver news
preferred by consumers, vertical product differentiation provides an
alternative simple explanation for the heretofore puzzling negative
impact of increased media competition on the provision on informa-
tion. In this section, I lay out a simple theoretical framework and then
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investigate empirically whether the impact of competition varies
with the extent of heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-to-pay.
4.2.1. Theoretical framework
I present my theoretical framework and a number of qualitative
predictions that guide the subsequent empirical exercise and help
to interpret the results. For the sake of concision, and also because
the main contribution of the paper is empirical in nature, the pre-
sentation of the full-ﬂedged theoretical model is left to the online
Appendix (Sections F and G). Here I only describe themain intuitions.
My theoretical framework builds uponmodels of vertical product
differentiation. For simplicity, I consider a model where two proﬁt-
maximizing newspapers compete to attract readers. I assume that
there exists a single attribute along which newspapers can differ-
entiate themselves, namely newspaper quality, and that readers are
heterogeneous in their willingness-to-pay for quality. I also assume
that there are increasing returns to scale in the production of news-
paper quality, in the sense that higher quality involves higher ﬁxed
costs (typically a larger newsroom and journalist wage bill) but no
additional marginal cost (once the higher-quality news is produced,
it can be reproduced for a limited cost). Newspapers ﬁrst choose
simultaneously their quality, and then compete simultaneously in
price. Under fairly general conditions, one can obtain the following
theoretical prediction:
Prediction 1. (Newspaper quality)
(i) When heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is high,
one duopolist produces a lower-quality newspaper than the
monopolist, and the other a higher-quality newspaper.
(ii) When heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is low,
both duopolists produce a lower-quality newspaper than the
monopolist.
The basic intuition behind Prediction 1 is the following.Whenhet-
erogeneity is high, the market is not covered under competition, and
newspapers can differentiate on quality to soften price competition
and increase market power. One duopolist produces a lower-quality
newspaper than the monopolist, and the other a higher-quality
newspaper. In contrast, when heterogeneity is low, the market is
covered under competition, leading to a business-stealing effect.
Newspapers have little space for differentiation, which leads to
stronger price competition (battle for market shares), decrease in
proﬁt, and lower resources available for quality investment.
The extreme case involves no heterogeneity at all in taste for
quality. Under these conditions, it is clear that competition does
not bring anything useful in terms of social eﬃciency. The business-
stealing effect dominates, and both newspapers under duopoly can
end up producing a lower-quality newspaper than the monopolist.
By continuity, this result also applies when heterogeneity is small.33
Finally, if we combine this model of newspaper competition with
a model of information acquisition and voting behavior, then we also
obtain a corollary prediction on media competition and turnout:
Prediction 2. (Turnout)
(i) When heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is high,
the entry of a newspaper leads to an increase in turnout.
33 In the online Appendix, I also introduce a second dimension of heterogeneity
between readers, namely regarding their preference for hard news vs soft news. I
show that when heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news is higher than
heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for soft news, one duopolist produces lower-
quality hard news than the monopolist and the other one higher-quality hard news.
In contrast, when heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for hard news is lower
than heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for soft news, both duopolists produce
lower-quality hard news than the monopolist.
(ii) When heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality is low,
the entry of a newspaper leads to a decrease in turnout.
4.2.2. Measures of heterogeneity
An important feature of my simple theoretical framework is that
the effect of entry depends on the extent of heterogeneity in con-
sumers’ willingness-to-pay. The choice of the data to quantify the
extent of heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality across
counties is a complicated issue. The most natural way to proceed
is to use income inequality measures. Exhaustive income tax tab-
ulations are available at the regional level over the 2004–2014
period in France. I use this data and generalized Pareto interpola-
tion techniques (Blanchet et al., 2017) in order to compute regional
measures of income dispersion. The regions with the highest income
inequality levels tend to be located in the South-Eastern part of the
country.
I then split my sample of counties between low-heterogeneity
and high-heterogeneity counties on the basis of the regions to which
they belong. That is, I classify as high-heterogeneity counties all
counties in the top four high-inequality regions (Provence-Alpes-
Côtes d’Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon, Rhônes-Alpes, and Corsica).34
Counties from other regions are classiﬁed as low-heterogeneity
counties located in low-heterogeneity regions. Given the fact that
in my simple theoretical framework the results depend on whether
a county is below or above a heterogeneity threshold, such a
binary measure of heterogeneity is more relevant than a continuous
measure.
Generally speaking, my results suggest that counties are char-
acterized by relatively low heterogeneity in France, in the sense
that the business-stealing effect appears to dominate (on average).
However, as I show below, this result comes entirely from the low-
heterogeneity counties, and does not apply in high-heterogeneity
counties (i.e. located in the top four high-inequality regions). Impor-
tantly, we observe entries and exits during my time period both in
low-heterogeneity and in high-heterogeneity counties.35
4.2.3. Results
According to my simple theoretical framework, the business-
stealing effect should be especially strong in low-heterogeneity coun-
ties during the Fifth Republic period (characterized by nonpartisan
reporting). In Fig. 6, focusing on the 1960–2014 period, I investigate
the effect of entry on circulation separately for low- and high-
heterogeneity counties. It clearly shows that the business-stealing
effect is much more signiﬁcant in low than in high-heterogeneity
places. In low-heterogeneity counties, there is no market expansion
after an entry (Fig. 6a). There is a negative impact on the circula-
tion of incumbent newspapers at the time of entry, and this impact
becomes stronger in the years following the entry. Eight years after
the entry, we observe a 10-percentage-point decrease in the circula-
tion of incumbent newspapers per eligible voter, which corresponds
to a 44% decrease.36 The business-stealing effect is much smaller
in high-heterogeneity counties. First, in these counties, there is a
small market expansion following the entry: the total county circu-
lation per eligible voter increases by 1.6 percentage points (Fig. 6b).
34 For instance, the ratio between the 90th and 10th percentile of the income distri-
bution is equal to 14.6 for these four regions, vs. 11.7 on average in other regions. The
exact ranking of regions varies slightly with the inequality indicator (interdecile ratios,
inverted Pareto coeﬃcients, Gini indexes, etc.), but these four regions are the only
regions which systematically belong to the top ﬁve high-inequality regions (whatever
the indicator).
35 Online Appendix Fig. D.2 shows for each year the number of counties with net
newspaper entry and the number of counties with net newspaper exit, separately for
low- and high-heterogeneity counties.
36 Between 1960 and 2014, the average circulation of incumbent newspapers per
eligible voter the year before an entry is 22.55%.
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Fig. 6. Impact of newspaper entry on newspapers’ circulation (1960–2014), by heterogeneity (controlling for demographics). Notes: The ﬁgures show coeﬃcients from a regres-
sion of circulation on a vector of year dummies going from −10 to +10 with the events of entry taking place in j = 0 (see Eq. (1) for details). In the two upper ﬁgures (6a and 6b),
the dependent variable is the total county circulation per eligible voter. In the two bottom ﬁgures (c and d), the dependent variable is the circulation of incumbent newspapers
per eligible voter. Figs. 6a and 6c show the effect of an entry on circulation in low-heterogeneity counties. Figs. 6b and 6d show this effect in high-heterogeneity counties. Models
include year and county ﬁxed effects and demographic controls. Error bars are ±2 standard errors. Standard errors are clustered by events. Time period is 1960–2014.
Second, the incumbent newspapers’ circulation only decreases by
1.9 percentage points at the time of the entry (Fig. 6d).
Next, I study how the impact of an entry on the size of the
newsroom, revenues and expenditures varieswith heterogeneity. For
the sake of simplicity and readability, I regroupmy indicator variables
for the years before and after entries into three indicator variables:
pre-entry (1entrypre-entryct = 1 in the 2nd and 1st pre-entry year),
short-run entry (1entryshort-runct = 1 in the entry year, the 1st, 2nd,
3rd and 4th post-entry year) and long-run entry (1entrylong-runct = 1
in the 5th post-entry year and all subsequent years). The base period
is the years before the entry, excluding the pre-entry period (i.e.
from t − 3 backwards). I interact these indicator variables with
the heterogeneity indicator variable. More precisely, my empirical
speciﬁcation is (abstracting from the exit terms)
ycnt =bpre-entry1entry
pre-entry
ct + hpre-entry1entry
pre-entry
ct ∗ Low heterogeneityc
+bshort-run1entryshort-runct + hshort-run1entry
short-run
ct ∗ LowHeterogeneityc
+blong-run1entry
long-run
ct + hlong-run1entry
long-run
ct ∗ Low heterogeneityc
+CLow heterogeneityc + X
′
ctd+ X
′
ct ∗ Low heterogeneitycs
+gt + qn + ecnt
(5)
where Low heterogeneityc is the low-heterogeneity indicator
variable equal to one for low-heterogeneity counties and to zero
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Table 6
The effect of entry on incumbent newspapers’ newsrooms, revenues and expenses, by Heterogeneity (newspaper-level analysis).
Journalists Total revenues Sales revenues Ad revenues Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pre-entry
(t − 2, t − 1) −0.17 0.21 −0.15 0.09 −0.15 0.30 −0.20 0.00 −0.21 −0.20
(0.14) (0.30) (0.18) (0.25) (0.19) (0.30) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.30)
Pre-entry * Low heterogeneity
(t − 2, t − 1) −0.42 −0.26 −0.54 −0.25 0.01
(0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.31) (0.35)
Short run
Impact of Entry
(t, t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4) −0.35*,∗∗ 0.22 −0.38∗∗ 0.22 −0.35∗∗ 0.41 −0.35∗∗ 0.34 −0.43∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.14) (0.30) (0.16) (0.32) (0.16) (0.35) (0.15) (0.30) (0.15) (0.34)
Short run * Low heterogeneity
Impact of entry
(t, t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4) −0.71∗∗ −0.78∗∗ −0.99∗∗ −0.92∗∗ −0.62
(0.34) (0.37) (0.39) (0.35) (0.38)
Long run
Impact of entry
(t+5, onwards) −0.32∗∗ −0.28 −0.18 0.02 −0.07 0.11 −0.10 0.23 −0.18 −0.03
(0.15) (0.34) (0.14) (0.40) (0.14) (0.41) (0.14) (0.40) (0.14) (0.43)
Long run * Low heterogeneity
Impact of entry
(t+5, onwards) −0.03 −0.22 −0.21 −0.38 −0.16
(0.37) (0.43) (0.45) (0.43) (0.45)
Low heterogeneity −3.34 1.23 −0.30 0.63 2.01
(2.56) (6.10) (6.11) (5.48) (5.19)
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls *Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-sq 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.59
Observations 11,487 11,487 7534 7534 6560 6560 6667 6667 6594 6594
Clusters (county) 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1960–2014. Models are estimated using OLS estimations. The dependent variables are in logarithm.
All variables (except for the number of journalists) are in thousand (constant 2014) euros. Models include year and newspaper ﬁxed effects, and demographic controls in all the
columns, as well as demographic controls interacted with the heterogeneity indicator variable in even columns. Variables are described in more details in the text.
∗ p<0.10.
∗∗ p<0.05.
∗∗∗ p<0.01.
otherwise. I allow the demographic covariates X′ct to have a different
impact in low- and high-heterogeneity counties.
In Table 6, I estimate Eq. (5) with different dependent variables
at the newspaper level: the number of journalists (columns 1 and
2), total revenues (columns 3 and 4), revenues from sales (columns
5 and 6), revenues from advertising (columns 7 and 8), and total
expenditures (columns 9 and 10). Odd columns present the results
without accounting for heterogeneity. Consistently with the results
of Table 4, I ﬁnd that the entry of a newspaper has a negative
impact on incumbent newspapers’ number of journalists, revenues
and expenditures following the shock (with no pre-trends). After
5 years, the negative effect is only statistically signiﬁcant for the
number of journalists (with a 32% drop), but the sign of the coef-
ﬁcients goes in the expected direction for all the other variables of
interest.
In the even columns, I investigate the extent to which the effect
varies depending on heterogeneity. For all the variables, it appears
clearly that the negative effect of an entry is entirely driven by
low-heterogeneity areas. While there is no impact of an entry on
the number of journalists in high-heterogeneity counties, this num-
ber decreases by around 50% in low-heterogeneity counties. This is
consistent with the ﬁrst testable prediction of my simple theoreti-
cal framework, when I proxy newspaper quality by the number of
journalists: under low heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for
quality, the entry of a newspaper leads to a decrease in the quality
of newspapers. Note however that the interaction is not statistically
signiﬁcant in the long run (after ﬁve years).
Finally, in the online Appendix Section C.2, I investigate whether
in the nonpartisan reporting period, other dimensions of hetero-
geneity come into play. I show that newspapers with a more
protective governance suffer more from increased competition in
terms of revenues, but not when we consider the number of
journalists.
Overall in this section, we have explored themechanisms through
which increased media competition negatively impacts newspa-
pers’ circulation, revenues, and production of information. In the
next section we investigate whether, through this negative effect
on information provision, media competition also affects political
participation.
5. Newspaper competition and electoral turnout
In this section, I ﬁrst consider whether electoral turnout varies
with newspaper competition. Given that I have shown that the neg-
ative impact of competition on information provision is stronger
in counties with more homogeneous populations, I next investigate
whether the turnout effect is also larger in these counties.
5.1. Speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation strategy
I match my panel data on newspaper competition with mayoral
election results from 1947 to 2014 and track the impact of a change
in competition on turnout. Let w index cities, c index counties and
t ∈ {1, . . . , 12} index election years (one time unit representing six
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Table 7
The effect of a change in the number of newspapers on voter turnout.
Baseline Falsiﬁcation test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout Turnout Previous election Previous election
Number of newspapers −0.003*,∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of newspapers * Low heterogeneity −0.006∗∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Region-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls *Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes
R-sq 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.26
Observations 5923 5923 4304 4304
Clusters (county) 87 87 87 87
Mean DepVar −0.019 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018
Sd DepVar 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.069
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1947–2014. Models are estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁca-
tions include election-region ﬁxed effects and demographic controls. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is turnout. In columns 3 and 4, I
perform a falsiﬁcation test: the dependent variable is turnout at the previous election.
∗ p<0.10.
∗∗ p<0.05.
∗∗∗ p<0.01.
calendar years). The outcome of interest, ywct, is voter turnout in city
w in county c at time t. The key independent variable of interest
is Nwct, the number of newspapers in city w in county c at time t.
Since turnout varies at the city level while the number of newspapers
varies at the county level (if two cities are in the same county, they
have the same number of newspapers), I cluster the standard errors
at the county level.
I assume that
turnoutwct =a1Nwct+a2Nwct ∗ Low heterogeneityc+a3Low heterogeneityc
+ X′wtd1 + X
′
wt ∗ Low heterogeneitycd2 + qw + lrt + ewct
where qw is a city ﬁxed effect, lrt is an election-region ﬁxed effect,
X′wt is a vector of observable characteristics at the city level, d1 and
d2 are vectors of parameters and ewct is a city-county-year shock.
Low heterogeneityc is the low-heterogeneity indicator variable equal
to one for low-heterogeneity counties and to zero otherwise.
Similarly to what is done in Gentzkow et al. (2011), I estimate the
model in ﬁrst differences. My estimation equation is then
Dturnoutwct =a1DNwct + a2DNwct ∗ Low heterogeneityc
+ DX′wtd1 + DX
′
wt ∗ Low heterogeneitycd2 + Dlrt + ewct
(6)
where D is a ﬁrst-difference operator. The vector X′wt includes the
same controls as before. Controls are deﬁned at the city level.
5.2. Main results
Table 7 presents the results. In the ﬁrst two columns, I show
the effect of an additional newspaper on local turnout. Column 1
presents this effectwithout considering heterogeneity. I ﬁnd that one
additional newspaper decreases turnout by approximately 0.3 per-
centage points. In column 2, it can clearly be seen that this negative
effect is driven by low-heterogeneity counties. I ﬁnd no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant impact of a change in the number of newspapers on
turnout at elections in high-heterogeneity counties.37 On the con-
trary, when I focus on low-heterogeneity counties, I ﬁnd that the
effect of an entrant on the market is minus 0.6 percentage points and
is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level.
The average turnout rate at local elections is 67%. Online
Appendix Fig. D.1 shows how it varies between 1947 and 2014. It
oscillates between 70% and 77% during the period 1947–1977 and
since then has been declining. In the 2014 election it was equal to
60%. Related to the 17-percentage-point decrease in turnout between
1947 and 2014, the 0.6-percentage-point negative effect of a typical
entry is thus of importance. Notemoreover that this negative turnout
effect is only due to the introduction of an additional local newspa-
per. If I extrapolate my results to other medias, this suggests that
the large increase in media competition during recent decades can
potentially explain a signiﬁcant fraction of the historical decline in
turnout.
My identiﬁcation relies on changes in the number of newspa-
pers over time. As a result it is correct as long as the timing of
these changes is random. In columns 3 and 4, I undertake a falsiﬁ-
cation test using the timing of the changes which seems to conﬁrm
that it is indeed the case. I estimate the impact of a future change
in the news market on current turnout. The coeﬃcients I obtain
are all non-signiﬁcant. This suggests that changes in the number of
newspapers are not driven by election results and brings conﬁdence
in interpreting the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst two columns as causal
effects.
As an additional check supporting a causal interpretation of
my ﬁndings, I use pre-trends. If the relationship between DNwct
and Dywct comes only from a causal effect, DNwct cannot be cor-
related with past values of Dywct. On the contrary, if the observed
relationship is driven by omitted components, DNwct and past val-
37 According to the very simple theoretical framework I present in Section 4.2.1
above, one may expect turnout to increase with entry in high-heterogeneity coun-
ties. Empirically, all counties in the top four high-inequality regions are classiﬁed as
high-heterogeneity counties. The empirical evidence obtained in column 2 suggests
that even high-heterogeneity counties thereby deﬁned are not that heterogeneous in
France. Or to put it another way, the ﬁndings of Table 7 suggest that in practice, most
counties in France are “low-heterogeneity” in the sense that the business-stealing
effect dominates.
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ues of Dywct may be correlated. In the online Appendix Fig. E.4, I
show that there are no signiﬁcant trends either before or after the
event.
5.2.1. Magnitude of the effects
My estimates suggest that increasing newspaper competition by
introducing an additional newspaper to a county decreases may-
oral turnout per eligible voter by about 0.3 percentage points on
average, and 0.6 percentage points in low-heterogeneity counties.
The average share of individuals reading at least one newspaper is
70%. Following the logic of Gerber and Green’s (2000) intent-to-treat
calculation (see also Gentzkow et al., 2011), my point estimate in
low-heterogeneity counties corresponds to a (0.6/0.70) = 0.86-
percentage-point effect.
To get a better sense of what the magnitude of my esti-
mates implies, I also compute the corresponding persuasion rate
(DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). The
persuasion rate captures the effect of the persuasion treatment on
the relevant behavior, adjusting for exposure to the message and for
the size of the population still to be convinced. In my case, everyone
is exposed the same way to newspapers so I do not need to adjust
for exposure to the message. The change in behavior is from voting
to not voting, so the set of potentially affected individuals is the set
of those who turn out, which represents on average 67% of the pop-
ulation. The 0.7% of eligible voters who do not vote as a result of
an increase in newspaper competition therefore implies a negative
persuasion rate of (0.7/0.67) = 0.9%.
These estimates are lower bounds. The entry of a newspaper
indeed raises the share of individuals reading at least one newspa-
per by about 8 to 12 percentage points. While the “intensive” margin
of newspaper competition — through the decrease in the quality
of the information provided to readers — has a negative effect on
the probability of voting, this “extensive” margin — the increase
in the number of readers — may have the opposite effect, since
previously non-informed citizens now have access to a source of
information. I am not capturing here the positive effect of the exten-
sive margin of entry; however, whereas the focus of the literature
has been on the extensive persuasion rate — media access leads to
higher turnout at elections — I show that the intensive margin of the
media — the change in media quality — can reverse the extensive
effect.
Abstracting from the change in the share of hard versus soft news
in newspapers, I ﬁnally compute the number of citizens who change
their behavior from voting to not voting due to a decrease of one in
the number of journalists. Depending on the speciﬁcations, the entry
of a newspaper leads to a decrease of about 9 to 25 journalists. As
I underline above, the treatment effect of the entry of a newspaper
is a .86-percentage-point decrease in turnout, which represents on
average 3000 voters in a county. In otherwords, each newspaper cost
cut of one journalist results in about 120 to 333 citizens failing to
vote.
5.2.2. Interaction with market structure
Finally, Table 8 shows how my estimated effects vary with the
extent of market competition. Following Gentzkow et al. (2011) and
Drago et al. (2014), I estimate my main model (6) by including a set
of interactions betweenDNwct and indicator variables for the number
of preexisting newspapers. There is no statistically signiﬁcant impact
of entry in counties with only one newspaper. But an increase in
competition leads to a large decline in turnout in low-heterogeneity
counties with two newspapers. The fact that the negative impact of
newspaper entry increases with the number of preexisting newspa-
pers in low-heterogeneity counties is not surprising: the higher the
number of newspapers before entry, the higher the probably that the
news market was already covered.
Table 8
The effect of a change in the number of newspapers on voter turnout depending on
the market structure.
(1) (2)
≥ 1 Newspaper −0.005 −0.009
(0.004) (0.007)
≥ 1 Newspaper
*Low heterogeneity 0.005
(0.008)
≥ 2 Newspapers 0.002 0.013*,∗∗ ,∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
≥ 2 Newspapers
*Low heterogeneity −0.015∗∗
(0.007)
≥ 3 Newspapers 0.003 −0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
≥ 3 Newspapers
*Low heterogeneity 0.010
(0.007)
≥ 4 Newspapers −0.004 −0.013
(0.006) (0.010)
≥ 4 Newspapers
*Low heterogeneity 0.014
(0.012)
≥ 5 Newspapers 0.001 0.021∗∗
(0.004) (0.010)
≥ 5 Newspapers
*Low heterogeneity −0.025∗∗
(0.010)
Region-year FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Controls *Heterogeneity No Yes
R-sq 0.19 0.19
Observations 5923 5923
Clusters (county) 87 87
Mean DepVar −0.019 −0.019
Sd DepVar 0.070 0.070
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Time period is 1947–
2014. Models are estimated in ﬁrst differences. All speciﬁcations include election-
region ﬁxed effects and demographic controls.
∗ p<0.10.
∗∗ p<0.05.
∗∗∗ p<0.01.
6. Discussion and interpretation of the results
6.1. Alternative mechanisms
Clearly I have not established that my simple theoretical frame-
work built upon models of vertical product differentiation is the
only framework that could generate a negative correlation between
newspaper competition and a decrease in turnout at elections. Other
theories may rationalize this ﬁnding. But I believe that it is diﬃ-
cult to ﬁnd an alternative theory for the result regarding the effect
of the interaction between the market structure and the extent of
heterogeneity in the willingness-to-pay for quality.
The issue of a dumbing-down of news content has been raised
both for newspapers and television. Zaller (1999) points out that
increased market pressure is sometimes associated with cutbacks in
reporting and editorial qualitywhich lead to a race to the bottom (see
also Arnold, 2002). Focusing on television, Popkin (2007) highlights
that competition changes content; he shows that in the 1990s, net-
work news covered less legislation than in the 1970s while celebrity
coverage increased (see also Hamilton, 2004; Jones, 2010).38 How to
explain such a race to the bottom in quality selections? The argument
38 Angelucci and Cagé (2019) and Angelucci et al. (2017) exploit historical data to
examine how, respectively, the introduction of advertising on television in France and
the introduction of television in the United States affected newspaper content. They
document a decline in quality following increased competition.
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I develop in this paper is that under low heterogeneity, competi-
tion leads to the division of the readership into smaller groups which
reduces the revenues available to each newspaper to produce a high-
quality paper. This simple theoretical framework rationalizes the
observed decrease in the quality of competing newspapers compared
to the monopolist in low-heterogeneity counties.
An alternative argument is that the race to the bottom may sim-
ply reﬂect a general decline in preferences for hard news compared
to soft news. I can rationalize this argument easily in the extension
of my simple theoretical framework in which I divide newspaper
content into hard news and soft news (online Appendix Section
F.1.5). In this framework, under the assumption that the average
willingness-to-pay for high-quality soft news is higher than the aver-
age willingness-to-pay for high-quality hard news, everything else
being equal, newspapers choose to produce more soft news than
hard news. This argument may explain part of the historical decline
in hard news coverage, but not the impact of the market structure
on the share of hard news, since the monopolist and the duopolists
react in the same way to a change in the average willingness-to-pay.
On the contrary, my simple theoretical framework can account for
the decrease in the share of hard news under increased competition.
A second argument that is often put forward in existing literature
is the role played by advertising (see e.g. Hamilton, 2004). Recent
papers in the ﬁeld model the market for news as a two-sided mar-
ket and study how advertising affects content (see e.g. Ellman and
Germano, 2009; Angelucci and Cagé, 2019; Shiller et al., 2017). Tak-
ing into account different values advertisers may place on different
readers is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as with a general
decline in preferences for hard news, advertising cannot account for
the impact of the market structure on the share of hard news.
Finally, the observed race to the bottom in quality selections has
been linked to the move from nonproﬁt to proﬁt-driven news orga-
nizations (see e.g. Jones, 2010; Cagé, 2015).39 According to Hamilton
(2004), “media companies once covered public affairs in part because
this brought prestige to the ﬁrm’s owners (. . . ). Now that newspapers
and television channels are part of large publicly traded ﬁrms, the focus
on proﬁts demanded by shareholders means less attention to public
affairs reporting.” In my simple theoretical framework, I assume that
newspapers are proﬁt maximizing. This assumption is driven both
by the move from nonproﬁt to proﬁt-driven news organizations in
the United States and by the evidence from France where news orga-
nizations, especially local daily newspapers, are proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms. Having said that, assuming that newspapers are benevolent
and operate under a positive-proﬁt constraint will lead to similar
predictions under low heterogeneity.
6.1.1. Polarization and self-segregation
Importantly, one could argue that an increase in media competi-
tionmay lead to changes in turnout at elections independently of any
impact on the quality of information. The ﬁrst channel throughwhich
this may happen is polarization and self-segregation. Through the
implied fragmentation of the market, an increase in media compe-
tition may reduce common experiences and lead to the polarization
of views among groups which avoid hearing information that might
contradict their priors (Sunstein, 2002; Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005; Sunstein, 2009). The widening of media choice and the elicited
self-segregation of citizens can affect voter turnout in at least two
ways. First, increased media choice leads to lower turnout among
people who prefer soft news to hard news because it reduces their
39 It may also be that, as highlighted by Noam (2009), in media industries in which
competition is weak, owners can afford to offer content based on their personal pref-
erences, rather than on their readers’ preferences, whichmay include a sense of public
service, i.e. more hard news. With increased competition, they may, on the contrary,
have to cater to their readers’ taste for soft news.
exposure to hard news and their acquisition of political knowledge
(Prior, 2007). This argument is relevant in the case of television
where there are entertainment channels entirely dedicated to soft
news; less so for local daily newspapers which always offer a mix
of soft and hard news. Second, by conﬁrming readers’ prior beliefs,
increased media competition may lead to an increase in the polar-
ization of voter preferences and through this channel to an increase
in political participation. This theoretical prediction contradicts my
empirical ﬁndings given that I document the fact that increased
media competition leads to a decrease — not an increase — in
participation.
6.1.2. Information overload
Finally, even if an increase in media competition were to increase
the amount of information available to readers, it could nevertheless
lead to a decrease in voter turnout through information overload.
The burden of a heavy information load may indeed confuse readers
and hamper decision-making (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005). Any-
how, these theoretical arguments cannot rationalize the empirical
ﬁndings of the paper. First, I establish that under low heterogeneity,
competition leads to a decrease — not an increase — in the quantity
of information provided by each competing newspaper. Whether or
not summing information over competing newspapers leads to an
increase or a decrease in the total amount of information available
in a market is a complicated empirical issue that I do not tackle in
this paper. But the existing empirical evidence shows that different
media outlets tend to cover similar issues so if anything competition
leads to a duplication rather than a proliferation of information.40
Moreover, the availability of more media outlets does not imply that
citizens consume more outlets. In particular, evidence from the con-
sumption of local daily newspapers in France shows that consumers
tend to single-home.
6.2. External validity
A ﬁnal question is whether we should expect the patterns I have
uncovered in the case of local daily newspapers and local elections in
France to be repeated in other contexts. First, should these patterns
hold in other countries? And second, should they still hold in the
internet era? There are good reasons to think this could be the case.
6.2.1. Consumers’ heterogeneity
To rationalize the negative impact of entry I propose a simple
theoretical framework that suggests that the effect of the market
structure on political participation operates through twomain ingre-
dients: newspapers operate under increasing returns to scale and
they face heterogeneous consumers that differ in their willingness-
to-pay for quality. The negative effect of competition on turnout
should be expected when heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness-
to-pay is low. The extent of heterogeneity can vary from country to
country and speciﬁc patterns will differ depending on the context.
The ﬁnding in Drago et al. (2014) of a positive effect of newspaper
competition on electoral participationmay be explained by high het-
erogeneity of Italian readership. More evidence is certainly in order
and it will be interesting to interact the effect of market structure
they obtain with a measure of heterogeneity to check whether it
is indeed the case. Similarly, while Gentzkow et al. (2011) ﬁnd no
effect of newspaper competition on turnout at national elections, it
would be of interest to test for the presence of an effect on local
turnout and to study the interaction between the market structure
and heterogeneity.
40 In their study of the production of online information in France in 2013, Cagé et
al. (2017) show that only one third of the online content produced by news media is
original. See also Boczkowski (2010).
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6.2.2. Media bias
The choice of the vertical differentiation framework is driven by
the fact that in recent years, local daily newspapers in France are
to a very large extent independent. While this feature is charac-
teristic of the local news market — national media tend to have a
stronger slant — it is not speciﬁc to France. According to Hamilton
(2004), nonpartisan reporting also dominates in American newspa-
per markets (see also Petrova, 2011). Furthermore, it is necessary to
highlight the importance of local newspapers for local democracy.
Even if some of my ﬁndings were not to hold for national media,
improving our understanding of the determinants of local informa-
tion is of interest per se. A decline in local journalism due to increased
competition can indeed have far-reaching consequences for politics
and the economy.41
6.2.3. Internet
With the internet — which some believe will allow voters to ﬁnd
all the information they need at the time of the elections — does the
information provided in local daily newspapers still matter? There
are various ways to tackle this issue. First, it is important to highlight
that online news is still in its infancy (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2015).
Even if consumers continue to increase the time they spend con-
suming digital media, newspapers are still a critical part of the news
landscape. As highlighted in a 2016 Pew Research Center survey, “the
digital news era is still very much in its adolescence”. In the majority
of countries, regional or local media carry on being prominent news
sources both oﬄine and online (Reuters Institute, 2017). Regarding
the United States, according to the State of the Media Report 2013 of
the Pew Research Center, “papers in smaller markets (. . . ) can remain
the go-to source for local news and a strong vehicle for local advertisers.”
Furthermore, individuals are much more likely to search on the
internet for soft news or information about product purchases than
for hard news (Hamilton, 2004). Internet expands the overall audi-
ence for the national daily newspapers but not for the local daily
newspapers. In France, I ﬁnd that in hard copy sales, the top ﬁve daily
newspapers account for 9% of the total circulation of daily newspa-
pers. The top daily newspaper is a local newspaper — Ouest France —
and accounts for 3.3% of this total circulation. The picture is different
when I turn to websites. In terms of the number of visits to a website
and, similarly, the number of pages viewed, the top ﬁvewebsites gar-
ner more than 53% of the total traﬃc, with 21% for the top paper, Le
Monde. Moreover the most popular websites are websites of national
daily newspapers.42 The internet is a way for consumers around the
country to gain access to national papers and national information
(or entertainment), not to gain access to more local information.
Finally, especially for newspapers, the internet brings greater
competition, raising the issue of the potential welfare losses that
may arise from excessive competition and the duplication of costs.
News sites — like newspapers — face ﬁxed costs of content that
depend on quality. Furthermore the internet increases the relative
importance of these ﬁxed costs: on the internet, the cost of paper
and distribution approach zero. Obviously this does not mean that
the advent of the internet has not affected the provision of informa-
tion; with the notable exceptions of Seamans and Zhu (2017) and
Cagé et al. (2017), there is little empirical evidence on how media
outlets adjust their content in response to increased competition
in an online world. But this means that the amount of information
41 Rubado and Jennings (2019), in their study of newspapers in California, ﬁnd that
when there are fewer reporters who cover an area, fewer people run for mayor, and
fewer people vote.
42 Hamilton (2004) ﬁnds a similar picture for the United States: “in hard copy sales,
the top 5 among America’s largest 100 newspapers account for 21.5 percent of the total
circulation. In terms of linking activity, the top 5 websites of these newspapers garner 41.4
percent of the total traﬃc.”
provided by local newspapers is still an important determinant of
local political participation in the digital era.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate empirically how an increase in the
number of newspapers in a market affects the quantity and type
of news provided and, ultimately, changes in political participation.
Using a new dataset of French local daily newspapers and local
elections between 1944 and 2014, I show that newspaper entry
sharply reduces the circulation of incumbent newspapers. Further-
more, thanks to the unique journalist data I gather, I bring to light
the consequences of such a decrease, namely a drop in the size of the
newsroom. I also provide anecdotal evidence of a “switching effect”,
with journalists moving from the incumbent newspaper’s newsroom
to the entrant’s. The decrease in the number of journalists impact the
content of newspapers whose size also goes down. Finally, I ﬁnd that
an increase in the number of local newspapers leads to a decrease in
political participation at local elections.
Exploiting the long time span covered by my data, I discuss a
number of mechanisms that may drive these empirical ﬁndings. In
the post-war period, most local newspapers were the organs of polit-
ical parties, and the negative impact of increased competition may
work through captured newspapers supplyingmore biased news in a
context of low potential advertising revenues. Consistently with this
prediction, I show that during the Fourth Republic, the drop in circu-
lation implied by entry is stronger for partisan than for independent
newspapers.
The Fifth Republic marks the end of partisan reporting. Draw-
ing from the literature on vertical product differentiation, I show
that if the heterogeneity of consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a high-
quality newspaper is low, an increase in the number of newspapers
leads to a decrease in newspaper quality and, eventually, to voter
participation at elections. The evidence I obtain is consistent with
this intuition. In particular, I show that the business-stealing effect is
particularly strong in low-heterogeneity counties, leading to a larger
drop in the size of the newsroom and ultimately in electoral turnout.
The ﬁndings of this paper question the view that more media
competition is necessarily socially eﬃcient. They obviously do not
imply that media competition is less desirable than media monopoly
as the latter raises other important issues, in particular media cap-
ture (Besley and Prat, 2006) and monopoly rents. But they may have
important policy implications. In my view, future research should
study the relevance of policy interventions to compensate for the
welfare losses that may arise from excessive competition under cer-
tain conditions. E.g. in some cases it might be desirable to encourage
newspaper competitors to enter into a joint operating agreement
and to combine business operations (which may require antitrust
exemptions in the spirit of the American Newspaper Preservation
Act (1970)). This can also involve the development of more favor-
able legal and ﬁscal status for media organizations (which in most
countries are not allowed to beneﬁt from nonproﬁt status), and sup-
port for news agencies that help to reduce the ﬁxed cost of news
production.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104077.
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